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RÉSUMÉ 
 
 Cet article caractérise l’évaluation sociale welfaristique dans un cadre multiprofil 
dans lequel, outre les multiples profils d’utilité, on suppose qu’il y a plusieurs profils 
d’information non welfaristique. Nous prouvons de nouvelles versions des théorèmes de 
welfarisme dans ce cadre alternatif et nous montrons qu’une propriété très plausible et 
faible d’anonymat est suffisante pour générer des ordres d’évaluation sociale anonyme.  
 
Mots clés : welfarisme, choix social multiprofil 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper characterizes welfarist social evaluation in a multi-profile setting 
where, in addition to multiple utility profiles, it is assumed that there are several profiles 
of non-welfare information. We prove new versions of the welfarism theorems in this 
alternative framework, and we illustrate that a very plausible and weak anonymity 
property is sufficient to generate anonymous social-evaluation orderings. 
 
Key words : welfarism, multiple-profile social choice 
 
 
1. Introduction
Welfarist principles for social evaluation rank social alternatives using information about
individual well-being (welfare, utility) alone, ignoring non-welfare information. As a re-
sult, those principles regard things such as liberty, freedom of expression or a healthy
environment as having instrumental value: they are valuable because of their contribution
to well-being.
Welfarism is the normative view that lies behind all of neoclassical welfare economics.
Bergson-Samuelson social-welfare functions depend on the utility levels of individuals only
and, in addition, Paretian compensation and consumer’s-surplus tests focus on preferences
as expressed in market behaviour.
Sen [1987] has criticized welfarism on the grounds that preferences or desires may not
always be consistent with well-being, noting that individual preferences may be aﬀected by
incomplete information and that “the underdog comes to terms with social inequalities by
bringing desires in line with feasibilities” (p. 11). Because of this, welfarist principles should
be coupled with accounts of well-being, such as those of Griﬃn [1986] and Sumner [1996],
that compensate for information problems and are comprehensive enough to capture all
aspects of the good life.1 In addition, because length of life aﬀects welfare, it is desirable to
focus on lifetime well-being rather than well-being in a single period. Without an account
of well-being that includes all aspects of the good life, the appeal of our axioms would be
signiﬁcantly diminished.
Conventional social-choice theory employs multiple proﬁles of welfare (utility) in-
formation only: non-welfare information is implicitly ﬁxed. In this setting, welfarism is
a consequence of the axioms unlimited (utility) domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and binary
independence of irrelevant alternatives.2 Because non-welfare information is ﬁxed, it is
impossible to discern the way in which a principle makes use of it. For that, multiple
non-welfare proﬁles are needed.
In this paper, we present a defense of welfarism in a framework in which both social
and individual non-welfare information may vary across information proﬁles. Social non-
welfare information may include information about the presence or absence of democratic
institutions or freedom of the press. Individual-speciﬁc non-welfare information may in-
clude length of life, whether the person has a propensity to work hard and whether he or
she likes classical music.
Each information proﬁle includes a vector of individual utility functions which rep-
resent welfare information, and a vector of functions which describe social and individual
1 See also Broome [1991] and Mongin and d’Aspremont [1998]. Challenges to welfarism by Sen and
others are discussed in Section 6.
2 See, for example, Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002], Bossert andWeymark [2002], d’Aspremont
and Gevers [1977], Guha [1972], Hammond [1979], Sen [1977, 1979] and Weymark [1998].
1
non-welfare information.3 In that setting, the independence axiom is formulated in terms
of both welfare and non-welfare information and it, together with unlimited domain and
Pareto indiﬀerence, is used to make a strong case in favour of welfarism. In addition, a
strong and natural argument for anonymity in social evaluation is developed.
A principle for social evaluation is a social-evaluation functional which associates an
ordering of the alternatives with each possible information proﬁle. Such a functional is
welfarist if and only if there is a single social-evaluation ordering of utility vectors such
that, for all information proﬁles, the ranking of any two alternatives is given by the ranking
of the corresponding utility vectors.
Our approach permits a compelling justiﬁcation of anonymous welfarism. The stan-
dard axiom requires the social ordering to be unaﬀected by a permutation of utility func-
tions across individuals with non-welfare information unchanged. It is possible, however,
that some individual may have non-welfare characteristics, such as being hardworking,
that are thought to justify special consideration and this lessens the ethical attractive-
ness of the axiom. By contrast, our anonymity axiom requires the social ordering to be
unaﬀected if both utility functions and individual non-utility-information functions are
permuted. Together with our other axioms, it implies that the social-evaluation ordering
must be anonymous: it ranks all permutations of any utility vector as equally good.
The basic intuition that lies behind welfarist social evaluation is the view that, if
one alternative is ranked as better than another, it must be better for at least one person
(see Goodin [1991]). Without this requirement, we run the risk of recommending social
changes that are empty gestures, beneﬁtting no one and, perhaps, harming some or all.
We use this intuition as an axiom which we call minimal individual goodness.
If, in any two alternatives, each person is equally well oﬀ, the Pareto-indiﬀerence
axiom requires the two alternatives to be ranked as equally good. Any social-evaluation
functional that satisﬁes minimal individual goodness necessarily satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀer-
ence (see Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002]). The latter axiom is employed in our
theorems because minimal individual goodness, which is stronger, is not needed.
In this paper, we restrict attention to the social evaluation of alternatives and, because
of that, we need not be concerned with uncertainty. It is possible, however, to extend
welfarist principles so that they are capable of ordering prospects: vectors of alternatives
whose components are uncertain. For discussions, see, for example, Blackorby, Bossert and
Donaldson [1998, 2002], Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [1999, 2002], Broome [1991]
and Harsanyi [1953, 1955]. In addition, welfarist principles can be extended so that they
can rank alternatives with diﬀerent populations and population sizes (Blackorby, Bossert
and Donaldson [1995, 2002], Broome [1999]).
3 See also Kelsey [1987] who provides a reformulation of Arrow’s [1951, 1963] theorem in a framework
where non-welfare information is explicitly modelled.
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Because some non-humans are sentient (capable of having experiences), applications
of welfarist principles often take account of their well-being. Sidgwick [1907, 1966, p. 414]
argues that we should “extend our concern to all the beings capable of pleasure and pain
whose feelings are aﬀected by our conduct.” We focus on humans in this paper, however;
for an extension of welfarist principles to sentient non-humans see, for example, Blackorby
and Donaldson [1992].
Section 2 presents our notation and deﬁnes social-evaluation functionals. In Section
3, we present our axioms and, in Section 4, we prove that any social-evaluation functional
with an unlimited domain that satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence and binary independence of
irrelevant alternatives must be welfarist, disregarding all non-welfare information. In Sec-
tion 5, we turn to anonymity and characterize anonymous social-evaluation orderings.
Section 6 provides a discussion of challenges to welfarism by Sen and others and Section
7 concludes.
2. Social-evaluation functionals
The set of all positive integers is denoted by Z++ and the set of real numbers by R. For
n ∈ Z++, letRn be the n-fold Cartesian product of R. Our notation for vector inequalities
is ≥, > and .
The (ﬁxed) set of individuals is N = {1, . . . , n}, n ∈ Z++. The set of alternatives is
X, and we assume that it contains at least three elements.
A utility (welfare) proﬁle is an n-tuple U = (U1, . . . , Un), where Ui:X → R is the
utility function of individual i ∈ N . Utility is an index of individual well-being. The set
of all possible utility proﬁles is U , and we write U(x) = (U1(x), . . . , Un(x)) for all x ∈ X
and for all U ∈ U .
Non-welfare information is described by a proﬁle K = (K0, K1, . . . , Kn), where
K0:X → S0 is a function that associates social non-welfare information with each alterna-
tive in X and, for all i ∈ N , Ki:X → S associates individual non-welfare information with
each alternative inX. The set S0 = ∅ is the set of possible values of social non-welfare infor-
mation, and S = ∅ is the set of possible values for individual non-welfare information. Sn is
the n-fold Cartesian product of S. The set of all possible proﬁles of non-welfare information
is K and, for all x ∈ X and for all K ∈ K, we deﬁne K(x) = (K0(x), K1(x), . . . , Kn(x)).
The set of all orderings on X is denoted by O. A social-evaluation functional is a
mapping F :D → O, where D ⊆ U ×K and D = ∅. We use the notation Υ = (U,K) and,
for convenience, we deﬁne RΥ = F (Υ) for all Υ ∈ D. The asymmetric and symmetric
factors of RΥ are denoted by PΥ and IΥ. Furthermore, we write Υ(x) = (U(x), K(x)) for
all x ∈ X and all Υ ∈ D.
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3. Axioms
If the social ordering associated with an information proﬁle ranks alternative x as better
than alternative y, it is reasonable to ask there to be at least one individual who is
better oﬀ in x than in y. Minimal individual goodness (Goodin [1991]; see also Blackorby,
Bossert and Donaldson [2002]) requires this condition to be met for all proﬁles and all
pairs of alternatives. If this axiom is not satisﬁed, social changes that are empty gestures,
beneﬁtting no one and possibly harming some or all, may be recommended.
Minimal Individual Goodness: For all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ ∈ D, if xPΥy, then there
exists j ∈ N such that Uj(x) > Uj(y).
Pareto indiﬀerence requires any two alternatives to be ranked as equally good whenever
each individual is equally well oﬀ in both.
Pareto Indiﬀerence: For all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ ∈ D, if U(x) = U(y), then xIΥy.
A social-evaluation functional satisﬁes minimal individual goodness if and only if it satisﬁes
Pareto indiﬀerence and Pareto weak preference.
Pareto Weak Preference: For all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ ∈ D, if U(x) > U(y), then
xRΥy.
Theorem 1 is due to Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002]; a proof is included for
completeness.
Theorem 1: F satisﬁes minimal individual goodness if and only if F satisﬁes Pareto
indiﬀerence and Pareto weak preference.
Proof. Suppose F satisﬁes minimal individual goodness. We ﬁrst prove by contradiction
that Pareto indiﬀerence is satisﬁed. Suppose not. Then there exist x, y ∈ X and Υ ∈ D
such that U(x) = U(y) and not xIΥy. Because RΥ is complete, either xPΥy or yPΥx. In
each case, we obtain a contradiction to minimal individual goodness.
Now suppose F violates Pareto weak preference. Then there exist x, y ∈ X and
Υ ∈ D such that U(x) > U(y) and not xRΥy. By the completeness of RΥ, we must have
yPΥx, again contradicting minimal individual goodness.
Finally, suppose F satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence and Pareto weak preference but vio-
lates minimal individual goodness. Then there exist x, y ∈ X and Υ ∈ D such that xPΥy
and U(y) ≥ U(x). If U(y) = U(x), we obtain a contradiction to Pareto indiﬀerence, and
if there exists j ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that Uj(y) > Uj(x), we obtain a contradiction to Pareto
weak preference.
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It is easy to see why Pareto indiﬀerence is implied by minimal individual goodness.
Suppose that each person is equally well oﬀ in x and y. Then it is not the case that at
least one person is better oﬀ in x and, by minimal individual goodness, it is not the case
that x is better than y. In addition, because it is not the case that at least one individual
is better oﬀ in y, it is not the case that y is better than x. Because the social ordering is,
by assumption, complete, x and y are equally good.
In addition to Pareto indiﬀerence, an unlimited-domain assumption and binary inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives are usually employed to generate welfarism. Unlimited
domain requires that F is capable of producing a social ordering for all possible proﬁles of
welfare and non-welfare information.
Unlimited Domain: D = U × K.
Binary independence of irrelevant alternatives is a condition that ensures consistency
across proﬁles. It requires the social ranking of any two alternatives to depend on the utility
information and non-welfare information associated with those two alternatives only. An
important property of this axiom is that it does not prevent non-welfare information from
being taken into consideration.
Binary Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: For all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ, Υ¯ ∈
D, if Υ(x) = Υ¯(x) and Υ(y) = Υ¯(y), then
xRΥy ⇔ xRΥ¯y.
We conclude this section with a formulation of strong neutrality. If the utility vectors
for alternatives x and y in one proﬁle are the same as the utility vectors for two (possibly
diﬀerent) alternatives z and w in another, strong neutrality requires the ranking of x and
y by the social ordering associated with the ﬁrst proﬁle to be the same as the ranking of
z and w by the social ordering associated with the second.
Strong Neutrality: For all x, y, z, w ∈ X and for all Υ, Υ¯ ∈ D, if U(x) = U¯(z) and
U(y) = U¯ (w), then
xRΥy ⇔ zRΥ¯w.
4. Welfarism
Our ﬁrst step towards proving a welfarism theorem with multiple non-welfare proﬁles con-
sists of showing that unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and binary independence of ir-
relevant alternatives together imply that the social ordering cannot depend on non-welfare
information. It is easy to see why this is the case if there are four or more alternatives.
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Welfare Information Non-Welfare Information
x y z w x y z w
Proﬁle Υ u v k 
Proﬁle Υ1 u v u v k  k¯ ¯
Proﬁle Υ2 u v u v k¯ ¯ k¯ ¯
Proﬁle Υ¯ u v k¯ ¯
Table 1
In Table 1, x, y, z and w are distinct alternatives, entries under the welfare-information
heading are utility vectors and entries under the non-welfare-information heading are non-
welfare-information vectors. In proﬁle Υ, utility vectors for x and y are u ∈ Rn and
v ∈ Rn and non-welfare information vectors for x and y are k ∈ S0×Sn and  ∈ S0×Sn.
In proﬁle Υ¯, utility vectors for x and y are the same, but the non-welfare-information
vectors may be diﬀerent and are denoted by k¯ and ¯. Information for all other alternatives
is unspeciﬁed and can be anything in the domain.
We show that the ranking of x and y by RΥ, the ordering corresponding to proﬁle
Υ, is the same as the ranking of x and y by RΥ¯, the ordering corresponding to proﬁle
Υ¯. To do so, we construct two other proﬁles which are feasible by the unlimited-domain
axiom. Proﬁle Υ1 coincides with proﬁle Υ on x and y but is speciﬁed for z and w. By
binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, the rankings of x and y by RΥ and RΥ1
are the same. Because the pairs (x, z) and (y, w) have the same utility vectors, Pareto
indiﬀerence requires RΥ1 to declare x and z to be equally good and y and w to be equally
good. Consequently, the two pairs are ranked in the same way by RΥ1 . Proﬁles Υ
1 and
Υ2 coincide on z and w and, by binary independence, the rankings of z and w by RΥ1
and RΥ2 are identical. In addition, Pareto indiﬀerence requires RΥ2 to rank the pairs
(x, y) and (z, w) in the same way. Because proﬁles Υ2 and Υ¯ coincide on x and y, binary
independence requires the rankings of x and y by RΥ2 and RΥ¯ to be the same. Together,
these observations prove the result.
The above discussion provides only a partial demonstration. Most of the complexity
in the following proof is a consequence of the possibility that |X| = 3.
Theorem 2: If F satisﬁes unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and binary indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, then, for all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ, Υ¯ ∈ D such that
U(x) = U¯(x) and U(y) = U¯(y),
xRΥy ⇔ xRΥ¯y. (1)
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Proof. Let x, y ∈ X and Υ, Υ¯ ∈ D be such that U(x) = U¯(x) and U(y) = U¯(y). Let
u = U(x) = U¯ (x), v = U(y) = U¯(y), k = K(x),  = K(y), k¯ = K¯(x) and ¯ = K¯(y).
Because X contains at least three alternatives, there exists z ∈ X \ {x, y}. By unlimited
domain, we can deﬁne the proﬁles Υ1, Υ2, Υ3 and Υ4 as follows. Let Υ1(x) = (u, k),
Υ1(y) = (v, ), Υ1(z) = (v, ¯), Υ2(x) = (u, k), Υ2(y) = (v, ¯), Υ2(z) = (v, ¯), Υ3(x) =
(u, k), Υ3(y) = (v, ¯), Υ3(z) = (u, k¯), Υ4(x) = (u, k¯) Υ4(y) = (v, ¯) and Υ4(z) = (u, k¯).
By binary independence of irrelevant alternatives, we have
xRΥy ⇔ xRΥ1y.
By Pareto indiﬀerence, yIΥ1z and it follows that
xRΥ1y ⇔ xRΥ1z.
Using binary independence again, we obtain
xRΥ1z ⇔ xRΥ2z.
By Pareto indiﬀerence, zIΥ2y and, therefore,
xRΥ2z ⇔ xRΥ2y.
Now binary independence implies
xRΥ2y ⇔ xRΥ3y.
By Pareto indiﬀerence, xIΥ3z and it follows that
xRΥ3y ⇔ zRΥ3y.
Using binary independence again, we obtain
zRΥ3y ⇔ zRΥ4y.
By Pareto indiﬀerence, zIΥ4x and it follows that
zRΥ4y ⇔ xRΥ4y.
Using binary independence once more, we obtain
xRΥ4y ⇔ xRΥ¯y.
Combining the above equivalences, (1) results.
If two proﬁles have the same welfare proﬁles, Theorem 2 demonstrates that the cor-
responding social orderings must be identical. The following theorem is an immediate
consequence.
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Theorem 3: If F satisﬁes unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and binary indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives, then there exists a functional f :U → O such that, for all
Υ = (U,K) ∈ D, F (Υ) = f(U).
Theorem 3 shows that a social-evaluation functional is equivalent to a functional
on a single-non-welfare-proﬁle domain. Because our axioms reduce to the standard ones
on the smaller domain, it is straightforward to show that Pareto indiﬀerence and binary
independence of irrelevant alternatives together are equivalent to strong neutrality if F
satisﬁes unlimited domain (see, for example, Blau [1976], Bossert and Weymark [2002],
d’Aspremont and Gevers [1979], Guha [1972] and Sen [1977]).
Theorem 4: Suppose F satisﬁes unlimited domain. F satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence and
binary independence of irrelevant alternatives if and only if F satisﬁes strong neutrality.
Proof. First, suppose that F satisﬁes strong neutrality. That binary independence of
irrelevant alternatives is satisﬁed follows from setting x = z and y = w in the deﬁnition of
strong neutrality. To show that Pareto indiﬀerence is implied, let U = U¯ and y = z = w.
Strong neutrality implies that xRΥy if and only if yRΥy whenever U(x) = U(y). Because
RΥ is reﬂexive, this implies xIΥy.
Now suppose that F satisﬁes unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and binary inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives. By Theorem 2, we know that non-welfare information
is irrelevant. Consider two proﬁles Υ, Υ¯ ∈ D and four (not necessarily distinct) alternatives
x, y, z, w ∈ X such that U(x) = U¯(z) = u and U(y) = U¯(w) = v.
By unlimited domain, there exist proﬁles Υ1,Υ2,Υ3,Υ4 ∈ D such that U1(x) = u,
U1(y) = v, U1(w) = v, U2(x) = u, U2(w) = v, U3(x) = u, U3(y) = v, U3(z) = u,
U4(y) = v and U4(z) = u.
By binary independence of irrelevant alternatives,
xRΥy ⇔ xRΥ1y.
By Pareto indiﬀerence, yIΥ1w and, therefore,
xRΥ1y ⇔ xRΥ1w.
Using binary independence of irrelevant alternatives again, we obtain
xRΥ1w⇔ xRΥ2w.
By binary independence of irrelevant alternatives,
xRΥ2w⇔ xRΥ3y.
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By Pareto indiﬀerence, xIΥ3z and, therefore,
xRΥ3y ⇔ zRΥ3y.
By binary independence of irrelevant alternatives,
zRΥ3y ⇔ zRΥ4y
and, using binary independence of irrelevant alternatives once more, we obtain
zRΥ4y ⇔ zRΥ¯w.
Combining the above equivalences, we obtain
xRΥy ⇔ zRΥ¯w,
and strong neutrality is satisﬁed.
Given unlimited domain and our assumption that X contains at least three elements,
strong neutrality is equivalent to the existence of a social-evaluation ordering R on Rn
which can be used to rank the alternatives in X for any proﬁle Υ ∈ D.4 The asymmetric
and symmetric factors of R are P and I . Combined with Theorem 4, this observation
yields the following welfarism theorem.5
Theorem 5: Suppose F satisﬁes unlimited domain. F satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence and
binary independence of irrelevant alternatives if and only if there exists a social-evaluation
ordering R on Rn such that, for all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ ∈ D,
xRΥy ⇔ U(x)RU(y). (2)
Proof. Clearly, if there exists a social-evaluation ordering R such that (2) is satisﬁed for all
x, y ∈ X and for all Υ ∈ D, then F satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence and binary independence
of irrelevant alternatives.
Now suppose F satisﬁes unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and binary indepen-
dence of irrelevant alternatives. By Theorem 4, F satisﬁes strong neutrality. We complete
the proof by constructing the social-evaluation ordering R. For all u, v ∈ Rn, let uRv if
and only if there exist a proﬁle Υ ∈ D and two alternatives x, y ∈ X such that U(x) = u,
U(y) = v and xRΥy. Strong neutrality implies that non-welfare information is irrelevant
and that the relative ranking of any two utility vectors u and v does not depend on the
4 Gevers [1979] uses the term social-welfare ordering for R.
5 See d’Aspremont and Gevers [1977] and Hammond [1979] for a version with a single non-welfare
proﬁle. Bordes, Hammond and Le Breton [1997] and Weymark [1998] prove variants of this theorem with
speciﬁc domain restrictions, again in the single-non-welfare-proﬁle case.
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proﬁle Υ or on the alternatives x and y used to generate u and v. Therefore, R is well-
deﬁned. That R is reﬂexive and complete follows immediately because RΥ is reﬂexive and
complete for all Υ ∈ D. It remains to show that R is transitive. Suppose u, v, q ∈ Rn are
such that uRv and vRq. By unlimited domain and the assumption that X contains at
least three alternatives, there exist a proﬁle Υ ∈ D and three alternatives x, y, z ∈ X such
that U(x) = u, U(y) = v and U(z) = q. Because U(x)RU(y) and U(y)RU(z), it follows
that xRΥy and yRΥz by deﬁnition of R. Because RΥ is transitive, we have xRΥz. Hence,
U(x)RU(z) or, equivalently, uRq.
Theorem 5 implies that, for all x, y ∈ X and all Υ ∈ D, xPΥy if and only if U(x)PU(y)
and xIΥy if and only if U(x)IU(y).
5. Anonymity
A principle for social evaluation may be welfarist and, at the same time, fail to be impartial.
That would be the case, for example, if a weighted sum of utilities of those who are alive
were used to rank alternatives with a weight of 2 for the utility of person 1 and a weight
of 1 for all other utilities. If there is a single non-welfare proﬁle, such a principle might be
justiﬁed by the fact that person 1 is hardworking in every alternative.
In such an environment, the anonymity axiom that is commonly used requires the
social ordering to be unchanged if utility functions are permuted across individuals (see
Sen [1970a], Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson [2002]). Although this produces the desired
result, the permutation of utility functions does not change non-welfare information and,
as a consequence, the case for anonymous welfarism is not compelling.
We employ a more compelling anonymity axiom. It requires the social ordering to be
unchanged if both utility functions and individual non-welfare information functions are
permuted across individuals.
Anonymity: For all Υ, Υ¯ ∈ D, if K0 = K¯0 and there exists a bijection ρ:N → N such
that Ui = U¯ρ(i) and Ki = K¯ρ(i) for all i ∈ N , then RΥ = RΥ¯.
Anonymity is easily defended because it allows non-welfare information to matter.
All that is ruled out is the claim that an individual’s identity justiﬁes special treatment,
no matter what non-welfare information obtains.
An ordering R on Rn is anonymous if and only if, for all u ∈ Rn and for all bijections
ρ:N → N ,
uI(uρ(1), . . . , uρ(n)).
Together with unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence and binary independence of irrele-
vant alternatives, anonymity is suﬃcient to ensure that the social-evaluation functional is
welfarist and anonymous.
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Theorem 6: Suppose F satisﬁes unlimited domain. F satisﬁes Pareto indiﬀerence,
binary independence of irrelevant alternatives and anonymity if and only if there exists
an anonymous social-evaluation ordering R on Rn such that, for all x, y ∈ X and for all
Υ ∈ D,
xRΥy ⇔ U(x)RU(y). (3)
Proof. Clearly, the existence of an anonymous social-evaluation ordering R such that (3)
is satisﬁed for all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ ∈ D implies that F satisﬁes the required axioms.
Conversely, suppose F satisﬁes unlimited domain, Pareto indiﬀerence, binary inde-
pendence of irrelevant alternatives and anonymity. By Theorem 5, there exists a social-
evaluation ordering R on Rn such that (3) is satisﬁed for all x, y ∈ X and for all Υ ∈ D.
It remains to show that R must be anonymous.
For j, k ∈ N with j = k, deﬁne the transposition bijection ρ¯jk:N → N by ρ¯jk(j) = k,
ρ¯jk(k) = j and ρ¯jk(i) = i for all i ∈ N \ {j, k}. For u ∈ Rn and j, k ∈ N with j = k, let
u¯jk = (uρ¯jk(1), . . . , uρ¯jk(n)). By unlimited domain, there exist Υ ∈ D and x, y ∈ X such
that U(x) = u and U(y) = u¯jk. Let Υ¯jk = ((Uρ¯jk(1), . . . , Uρ¯jk(n)), (K0, Kρ¯jk(1), . . . , Kρ¯jk(n))).
By anonymity, RΥ = RΥ¯jk .
Because U(x) = U¯ jk(y) = u and U(y) = U¯ jk(x) = u¯jk, we have
uRu¯jk ⇔ xRΥy ⇔ yRΥ¯jkx (4)
and
u¯jkRu⇔ yRΥx⇔ xRΥ¯jky. (5)
Because RΥ = RΥ¯jk , (4) and (5) together imply
uRu¯jk ⇔ u¯jkRu
and, because R is complete, both uRu¯jk and u¯jkRu are true, so uIu¯jk.
Now let v = (uρ(1), . . . , uρ(n)) for any bijection ρ:N → N . Then there exist a ﬁnite
number of transposition bijections such that ρ is the composition of those bijections. By
repeated application of the above argument, uIv.
The anonymity axiom used in this section is not the only possible one. An alter-
nate axiom applies to each proﬁle separately. If the associated utility and individual
non-welfare-information vectors for any one alternative are the same permutation of the
corresponding vectors for a second, the axiom requires the two alternatives to be ranked
as equally good. Neither it nor anonymity requires non-welfare information to be ignored
and, in the presence of our other axioms, both imply anonymous welfarism.
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6. Challenges to welfarist social evaluation
In this section, we discuss some of the most important criticisms of welfarist social evalu-
ation.
Welfarist principles for social evaluation are sometimes criticized as taking a narrow
view of being a person, seeing them as “locations of their respective utilities” only (Sen
and Williams [1982, p. 4]). The use of comprehensive accounts of lifetime well-being, such
as those of Griﬃn [1986] and Sumner [1996], which attempt to take account of everything
in which individual people have an interest, is, in our view at least, suﬃcient to respond
to this criticism.
Griﬃn’s ‘list’ view of well-being focuses on an enumeration of basic elements of the
good life such as enjoyment, freedom from anxiety, good health, pleasure and the absence
of pain, limbs and senses that work well, length of life (when it is worth living), autonomy,
liberty, understanding, accomplishment, satisfying work and good human relationships.
A ceteris paribus increase in any element on the list increases well-being. But individual
people may diﬀer in the way that the items on the list contribute to their welfare. Sumner’s
account focuses on happiness and it is equated with life satisfaction “which has both an
aﬀective component (experiencing the conditions of your life as fulﬁlling and rewarding)
and a cognitive component (judging that your life is going well for you)” (p. 172). Like
Griﬃn, Sumner allows for many determinants of well-being.
Sen [1987, p. 11] criticizes preference and desire accounts of well-being on the grounds
that “the battered slave, the broken unemployed, the hopeless destitute, the tamed house-
wife, may have the courage to desire little.” This observation points to the need for
full-information qualiﬁcations in those accounts. All of the best ones, such as those of
Broome [1991], Griﬃn [1986], Mongin and d’Aspremont [1998], and Sumner [1996], do
this. Sumner also includes an autonomy qualiﬁcation. Well-being is identiﬁed with what
the individual would prefer if he or she were fully informed and, possibly, autonomous. It
follows that actual preferences may not always be consistent with individual well-being.
A theory of well-being which focuses on ‘functionings and capabilities’ is presented
by Sen [1985]. Functionings are the ‘doings and beings’ a person achieves. Reﬁning the
list of possible functions to the list actually used is seen as a valuational exercise and
aggregation of the items on the resulting list is inﬂuenced by individual diﬀerences. Sen’s
view is similar to Griﬃn’s but he adds another dimension. Capabilities are opportunities
to achieve various functionings and they are seen as valuable in themselves.6 The presence
of capabilities on Sen’s list gives him a way to value individual liberty.
Sen’s theory can be employed in a welfarist context, nevertheless. What is needed is
an individual goodness relation which ranks all the possible combinations of functionings
6 Nussbaum [2000a,b] focuses almost exclusively on capabilities. For a discussion of Sen’s approach,
see Sumner [1996, pp. 60–68].
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and capabilities. Although the resulting view of well-being would be more objective than
the ones we favour, there would be no diﬃculty in using it with welfarist principles.7
Fixed-population utilitarianism exhibits indiﬀerence to inequality of well-being, and
this has prompted the complaint that “persons do not count as individuals in this any more
than individual petrol tanks do in the analysis of the national consumption of petroleum”
(Sen and Williams [1982, p. 4]). Although utilitarianism exhibits no aversion to utility
inequality, it is averse to inequality of consumption. We can be reasonably sure that, for
people in good health, the value of an additional dollar’s worth of consumption declines
as consumption increases. For that reason, a transfer of consumption from rich to poor—
without indirect eﬀects—increases total utility and is seen as good by utilitarianism. In
addition, it is easy to see that the utilitarian principle is concerned with the needs of the
sick and disabled. Moreover, the criticism of Sen and Williams does not apply to welfarist
principles that are averse to utility inequality: they rank more equal distributions of utility
as better than less equal ones.
An interesting challenge to welfarism that makes use of widely held moral intuitions
has been oﬀered by Sen [1979] and it is summarized in Table 2.8 In x, person 1 is poor and
hungry and person 2 is rich and has plenty of food. Alternative y results from a transfer
of food from person 2 to person 1. In it, both total utility and minimum utility rise and,
as long as other people are unaﬀected, any weakly inequality-averse welfarist principle
declares y to be better than x. In alternative z, person 1, who is a sadist, receives no
transfer of food, but is allowed to torture person 2. The utility levels are not based on
poorly informed or non-autonomous preferences but are supposed to represent well-being
accurately.
x y z
Person 1 40 70 70
Person 2 100 80 80
Table 2
Because utility levels are the same in y and z, Pareto indiﬀerence requires them to
be ranked as equally good. Consequently, z and x must be ranked in the same way that
7 Kolm [1972, 1996] presents a theory of individual well-being in which preferences, which represent
happiness, are completely determined by individual characteristics. The resulting goodness relation is
called a fundamental preference relation for the individual and it provides an account of well-being that
can be used in welfarist social evaluation.
8 See also Roemer [1996, p. 30].
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y and x are. It follows that, if food redistribution is good, torture is also good. Sen’s
conclusion is that we should abandon the Pareto indiﬀerence axiom along with welfarist
social evaluation.
Sen’s example appeals to a moral intuition that sees torture as bad. That intuition
rests on beliefs about the welfare consequences of torture, however. People who are tor-
tured suﬀer terribly at the time of their ordeal and for many years afterward if they survive.
The intuition is linked, in the example, to two implausible claims of fact: that torture can
be a substitute for decent nutrition and that a loss of food to the rich person is just as
bad as being tortured. If we really could make starving people better oﬀ in this way, the
world’s problems would be easier to solve. In addition, we are rightly suspicious about the
implicit assumption that there are no indirect eﬀects of the torture. No reasonable gov-
ernment would pass a law that allows one particular (named) person to torture another.
Rather, a change in law that applies more widely would be required. Such a legal change
is likely to raise the level of bad behaviour substantially, with disastrous consequences for
present and future generations.
Sen’s example provides an illustration of the connection between welfarism and min-
imal individual goodness. If y (food redistribution) is ranked above z (torture), no one is
better oﬀ in y and minimal individual goodness is not satisﬁed. Now suppose that, in z,
utility levels were 71 and 81 instead of 70 and 80. If y is ranked as better than z, the weak
Pareto principle is also violated.
An interesting challenge to welfarism has appeared in recent years. It replaces concern
for well-being with concern for opportunities for well-being on the grounds that individual
people are responsible for their choices (in certain circumstances they may be thought to
be responsible for their preferences as well).9 In practice, welfarists often agree that the
provision of opportunities is socially warranted, but their concern is with actual well-being.
If autonomy is a signiﬁcant aspect of well-being, people must be free to make important
choices for themselves, and this provides a constraint which restricts the feasible set of
social possibilities. By way of analogy, parents typically try to provide opportunities for
their children, but that does not mean that opportunities are what they care about.
Although welfarist principles are consistent with rights (see Mill [1861, 1969, Chapter
5]), they are not consistent with unconditional rights. An example of this is Sen’s [1970a,
Chapter 6, 1970b] Paretian liberal paradox.10 We present a variant of one of Sen’s examples
in Table 3.
9 See, for example, Arneson [1989, 2000a,b], Roemer [1996] and, for an unsympathetic critique, Ander-
son [1999]. See also Fleurbaey and Maniquet [2002].
10 See also Gaertner, Pattanaik and Suzumura [1992].
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Welfare Information
x y z
Who Attends Person 1 Person 2 No One
Proﬁle Υ (1, 1) (3, 3) (3, 1)
Proﬁle Υ¯ (2, 3) (1, 2) (3, 1)
Table 3
Person 2 wants to see a violent movie but her friend person 1 does not. There are many
alternatives but we focus on three which, apart from movie attendance, are identical. In
x, person 1 sees the movie but person 2 does not, in y, person 2 sees the movie but person
1 does not and, in z, neither sees the movie. The utility pairs in the table (person 1’s
utility ﬁrst) represent the individual goodness relations for both people. In proﬁle Υ, for
example, person 1’s utility level is 3 and person 2’s utility level is 1 in alternative z.
Because movie attendance is thought to be a private matter, rights are assigned:
person 1’s utilities decide the ranking of x and z and person 2’s utilities decide the ranking
of y and z. In proﬁle Υ, each person’s utility is unaﬀected by the other’s behaviour: person
1 is better oﬀ not seeing the movie and person 2 is better oﬀ seeing it. Because person 2’s
utility decides the ranking of y and z, y is better than z and, because person 1’s utility
decides the ranking of x and z, z is better than x. Transitivity requires y to be better
than x.
But should such rights be unconditional, applying to all possible proﬁles? In proﬁle
Υ¯, each person’s utility depends, in part, on the behaviour of the other. Person 1’s utility
is highest in z but x is better than y for him because he believes that the movie may have
an adverse eﬀect on person 2’s character. Person 2 is worst oﬀ in z but ranks x above y:
she thinks that attending the movie would help person 1 face the realities of life.
Because person 2’s utility decides the ranking of y and z, y is better than z. And,
because person 1’s utility decides the ranking of x and z, z is better than x. Transitivity
requires y to be better than x, but x is ranked as better than y by weak Pareto. In this case,
rights assignments are incompatible with the weak Pareto axiom. Because all commonly
used welfarist principles satisfy weak Pareto, it follows that they cannot accommodate
unconditional rights over all proﬁles.
Rights of the type Sen discusses are typically justiﬁed, in part, on the grounds that
the choices under consideration aﬀect the individual with the right much more than they
aﬀect others, a condition that is met in some, but not all, proﬁles. In the example of
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Table 3, the assigned rights can be justiﬁed if individual preferences correspond roughly
to those of proﬁle Υ. This suggests that rights assignments should be, to some extent,
proﬁle-dependent. If this view is accepted, Sen’s paradox disappears.
7. Conclusion
Variants of the welfarism theorem can be proven on several diﬀerent domains. If the domain
consists of a single proﬁle, the theorem requires Pareto indiﬀerence only: unlimited domain
and binary independence of irrelevant alternatives are not needed because there is only one
proﬁle (Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark [1990]). And, as is well known, the theorem
is true with multiple welfare proﬁles and a single non-welfare-information proﬁle.
In both these cases, it would be wrong to conclude that non-welfare information
is irrelevant. In the single-proﬁle case, if all of the utility vectors are distinct, Pareto
indiﬀerence imposes no restriction and it might be true that the principle uses only non-
welfare information in ranking alternatives. This is consistent with the formal deﬁnition
of welfarism; a single ordering of utility vectors exists and it can be used to order the
elements of X. A similar observation can be made in the single-non-welfare-proﬁle case.
When the domain of the social-evaluation functional consists of multiple proﬁles of
welfare and non-welfare information, no such ambiguity exists. As Theorem 2 indicates,
any principle with an unlimited domain must ignore non-welfare information. Our version
of the welfarism theorem is, therefore, more powerful in this sense.
On a multi-proﬁle domain, the welfarism theorem implies that any principle for social
evaluation with an unlimited domain that uses non-welfare information must fail to satisfy
Pareto indiﬀerence or binary independence of irrelevant alternatives. If it does not satisfy
independence, it must be inconsistent across proﬁles. Because independence applies only
to pairs of proﬁles for which welfare and non-welfare information coincide on a pair of
alternatives, such inconsistency is not easily defended. On the other hand, if it does
not satisfy Pareto indiﬀerence, it must also fail to satisfy minimal individual goodness.
Such principles can have little ethical appeal as long as the account of well-being that is
employed is a comprehensive one.
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